Is the CCP Having Doubts About a Taiwan Invasion?

Taiwan once again braced for several days of harassment by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) navy and air force as the Chinese regime conducted military drills around the island this month. These exercises, often acts of intimidation, signal Xi’s assertion that he could just as easily order the PLA to use live ammunition and fulfill his promise to annex Taiwan. However, emerging signs from China suggest that Xi may be questioning the regime’s ability to seize Taiwan or engage in a war with the United States.

Since assuming leadership in 2012, Xi has prioritized combating corruption within the PLA, beginning with the 2014 investigation of Gen. Xu Caihou, a former vice chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC). This marked the first time a high-ranking PLA officer faced such scrutiny. Over the years, the campaign has intensified, with a significant escalation in 2023 leading to the removal of nearly 20 military and defense industry officials. Last month, Adm. Miao Hua, a senior CMC member, was suspended pending an investigation for serious disciplinary violations.

Xi’s anti-graft campaign has significantly disrupted the PLA’s upper echelon, implicating numerous high-ranking officials, including former Defense Ministers Wei Fenghe and Li Shangfu. Issues of corruption and potential disloyalty have cast doubt on the PLA’s operational capacity despite Xi’s emphasis on modernization, information warfare capabilities, and overall readiness. However, if Xi lacks trust in his generals, even the most advanced technology would be insufficient for a war against the world’s most powerful military—a reality Xi may now be coming to terms with.

Meanwhile, the United States has intensified preparations to defend Taiwan, approving arms packages and conducting joint war games with the Philippines to counter potential Chinese aggression. The United States has also been conducting large-scale military drills with Japan and South Korea, including Freedom Edge 24-2 in the East China Sea. These exercises involve at least seven warships, including the aircraft carrier USS George Washington, guided-missile destroyers USS McCampbell, USS Higgins, and USS Dewey, the Japanese destroyer JS Haguro, and South Korean destroyers ROKS Seoae Ryu Seong-ryong and ROKS Chungmugong Yi Sun-sin, along with numerous fighter jets, surveillance planes, and other aircraft. Even if Xi were confident in the PLA’s ability to counter the United States, the combined military strength of the United States and its Pacific allies would undoubtedly complicate his strategic planning.

The military is one of the most important tools at the CCP’s disposal for capturing Taiwan and confronting the United States, but its strength is only as robust as the economy that fuels it—and this is another area where Xi appears to be losing confidence. In response to mounting economic challenges and anticipated trade tensions with Trump’s return to the U.S. presidency, Xi has announced a bold economic strategy for 2025—this includes shifting to a “moderately loose“ monetary policy and ”more proactive” fiscal measures.

Beijing aims to boost domestic consumption, stabilize property and stock markets, and modernize supply chains to address issues like deflation, weak corporate investment, and declining consumer prices. With a projected GDP growth target of around 5 percent, proposed initiatives include potential fiscal deficit increases, rate cuts, and consumption-driven programs such as cash-for-clunkers.

This marks the first departure from China’s 14-year “prudent” monetary stance. On the one hand, the CCP’s adoption of such an expansionist monetary and fiscal policy underscores the urgency of addressing a sluggish post-COVID recovery and a beleaguered property market while bracing for intensified U.S.–China trade conflicts. On the other hand, it suggests that Xi may lack confidence in his economy’s readiness for war.

Similarly, the recent military purges indicate Xi’s doubts about the reliability and trustworthiness of the PLA. Taken together—an unstable economy and an untested, possibly untrustworthy army—it appears Xi may be forced to delay his proposed milestone goals for 2027, 2035, and 2049. This delay could mean the Chinese regime is not ready to confront the U.S. militarily, dethrone it as the global hegemon, or achieve the CCP’s long-standing goal of capturing Taiwan.

While Xi may hope that replacing corrupt generals with trustworthy ones will strengthen the PLA, the fact remains that its high-level officials have limited experience. Likewise, the CCP’s proposed economic stimulus is unlikely to address the $13 trillion shortfall in China’s property sector or equip the economy to endure the strains of war.