Tip of the Spear: The US Coast Guard Versus China’s Navy

Commentary

The U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) is punching way above its weight. At about 40,000 sailors compared to the U.S. Navy’s (USN’s) 340,000, the USCG is simultaneously up against the Chinese and Russian navies.

The USCG operates in the South China Sea, the Strait of Malacca off Singapore, and the Gulf of Oman. The Coast Guard is not only interdicting illicit drugs and illegal immigrants, for which it is justly famous, but operating with allied coast guards around the world to defend U.S. and allied maritime territory against the aggression of adversary nations.

The USCG does not have the big guns for a shooting war that its big brother and backup the USN carries. But until that time, the Coast Guard is at the tip of the spear, nimbly going where the USN would make too much of a statement. That includes occasionally playing defense against the Chinese and Russian navies.

On July 6 and 7, four Chinese warships, including a guided missile cruiser and destroyer, transited near Alaska’s Aleutian Islands. The warships traveled within the U.S. exclusive economic zone (EEZ), which stretches 200 nautical miles from the coast of the island chain and other parts of the U.S. coast. China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) transits have occurred annually since at least 2017. In some cases, Russian naval vessels accompany the PLAN. The transits by authoritarian countries unnerve Aleutian residents and fishermen, who have asked for a stronger U.S. military presence.

To counterbalance the most recent incident, the USCG sent a cutter and HC-130 Hercules surveillance plane to trail the ships and ensure they did not cause too much trouble, for example, by crossing into U.S. territorial waters up to 12 nautical miles from shore. Perhaps the U.S. Armed Forces had other less publicized U.S. Air Force or USN air and submarine assets on hand as well. One would hope so.

Other examples are the USCG’s increased training exercises with Japan and the Philippines in their territorial waters. In some cases, these waters are unjustly claimed by the Chinese regime. When the USCG gets involved, that can be enough to back the PLAN and its subordinates off, at least partially. USCG training with the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) on July 17, for example, was followed a few days later by a seeming concession by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). On July 21, the PLAN and its subordinate China Coast Guard (CCG) were bound by an agreement with the Philippines in which the CCP would “allow” the Philippines to resupply the Second Thomas Shoal, where Philippine marines man an old beached USN transport ship.

The CCG had previously tried using ramming, lasers, water cannons, axes, and knives to stop Philippine marines from their resupply missions, resulting in the injury of a Philippines sailor in June. The CCG has taken similar measures before, coming to “gentlemen’s agreements” about resupply and attempting to use the agreements as evidence that sovereignty over the shoal lies with China.

The very act of having to negotiate with the CCP to stop harassing the resupply of the shoal is arguably a concession. So the Philippine wins are only partial. A long voyage remains ahead. The more muscle the USCG and PCG can put at the shoal and other disputed features in the South China Sea, the fewer concessions the Philippines will have to make in these agreements.

In the South Pacific, the USCG is partnering with other island nations to enforce their EEZs against illegal fishing by China’s maritime militia (CMM). This involves the USCG boarding CMM ships when local police from countries in the region request help in enforcing their laws. The CMM are typically large steel-reinforced fishing vessels capable of ramming other ships. They are subtly armed and their fuel is subsidized by the regime in Beijing. Like the CCG, they are under the ultimate command of the People’s Liberation Army, which is under the control of the CCP. Control over all of China’s assets generally rolls up to the top in Beijing. In April, the USCG hosted officials from Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, and Vanuatu on its ships. With their participation and at their request, the USCG and local police conducted 23 boardings of mostly CMM boats in these countries’s respective EEZs. In the process, the local police found 12 violations.

China’s coast guard is also operating against U.S. partners Japan and Taiwan, which requires our help. In the context of repeated threatening transits by the CCG near Japanese and Taiwanese islands, the USCG has increased cooperation and joint operations planned with the Japanese and South Korean coast guards. In June, the three coast guards conducted their first joint exercises off the coast of Kyoto prefecture, in which patrol boats from the three nations and two helicopters participated.

The USCG is doing all of this and more around the world at only 90 percent of its authorized strength. Given the CCP’s propensity for gray-zone conflicts short of militarized disputes, it is time to double the USCG’s budget, ships, and personnel while upping their technological game. The USCG needs to update and better maintain its older vessels, improve its cyber-warfare capabilities, mount non-lethal crowd-control measures, commission new 154-foot fast-response cutters and Expeditionary Transfer Dock (ETD) ships to launch drones, and establish forward operating bases in remote locations to support America’s global network of allies. Costs for these measures could and should be borne by the allied countries worldwide that benefit or through tariffing and sanctioning adversary countries that cause problems in the first place. American citizens should not have to bear all of the burden, though we are ready to do our part.

The USCG is doing a lot with a little. USCG sailors are putting their lives on the line in the unforgiving oceans to protect America and our allies. They deserve more than our heartfelt thanks. They deserve the kind of recognition that only more resources will be provided to do the job well.

Views expressed in this article are opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.

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